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Abstract 
It is well known that unobserved heterogeneity across workers and firms seriously impacts the 
computation of the determinants of individual earnings in standard human capital earnings 
functions. Following the tradition of AKM (Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis, 1999), this paper 
offers an alternative way of controlling unknown worker and firm heterogeneity by taking full 
advantage of a matched employee-employer dataset based on two key Portuguese micro 
databases. Our modelling strategy assumes that the gap between individual and firm average 
wages, unexplained by differences in observable characteristics, gives the extent to which the 
unobserved ability of a given individual deviates from the unobserved worker average ability 
in the firm. This methodology has, in particular, the advantage of not relying exclusively on 
information on job switchers to identify worker and firm effects, thus avoiding any bias 
arising from endogenous worker mobility. Another important aspect of our treatment is that it 
allows the estimation of worker effects without risk of contamination from firm effects. To 
test our modelling we use an original 2-year longitudinal LEED dataset, comprising of more 
than 400 thousand workers and 1,500 firms in each year. We focus on two separate sets of 
individuals (i.e. stayers and switchers) and provide a variety of robustness tests, including 
replication of the original AKM methodology. After controlling worker and firm effects, our 
results show that the acquisition of schooling, labor market experience, and training, inter al., 
pays off.  Moreover, we do find evidence of a large bias in standard OLS return rates to 
typical covariates.  Evidence from Monte Carlo simulation and bootstrapping also shows that 
our estimated rates of return to human capital do not seem to be sensitive to changes in 
various assumptions. Our study does provide therefore further evidence that a wide set of 
individual and firm characteristics is crucial to understanding the true role of human capital 
variables in labor markets.  
2 
The accident of birth plays a powerful role in explaining variability in lifetime income. 
James J. Heckman (2008) 
 
1. Introduction 
 Measuring human capital is essential to understanding the determinants of individual 
earnings in the labor market. However, and despite substantial improvement in quality of 
available micro datasets, there are still sizeable differences in productivity and wages across 
firms and individuals requiring further explanation. The most common indeed is to observe 
workers with apparently identical attributes employed in apparently similar firms earning 
different wages. This discrepancy must of course be due to unmeasured differences both at 
firm and worker level. 
The omission of relevant variables put human capital earnings functions under 
considerable stress as observable and unobservable attributes are likely to be correlated. For 
instance, workers with higher intrinsic abilities are expected to select themselves into higher 
levels of schooling. In this case, schooling is deemed to be endogenous, which means that the 
corresponding OLS estimate will reflect the direct effect of schooling on wages as well as a 
self-selection effect. In the limit, this contamination invalidates any meaningful interpretation 
of regression coefficients. 
In this study, we follow Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) – AKM hereafter –
tradition as we deliberately try to control for firm and worker (unobserved) effects. But by 
using a longitudinal LEED dataset, obtained from matching Quadros de Pessoal and Balanço 
Social, our approach follows a different route. Indeed, we develop an original modelling in 
which we try to take full advantage of the fact that in our dataset we can observe not only a 
rather comprehensive set of individual- and firm-level characteristics – including firm-
provided training – but also follow individuals longitudinally.  
Firstly, we start by considering a Mincerian model to analyse the relation between the 
individual hourly wage and a set of observable worker and firm attributes. Secondly, we use a 
similar model, run at firm level, to predict firm average wages to next assume that the 
3 
difference between the expected wage and the expected firm average wage is explained by the 
gap in observable characteristics between the individual and the firm average. Then, once 
taken the observed characteristics into account, any difference left is attributed to differences 
in unobserved heterogeneity. We also assume that the firm unobserved effect contains 
workers’ average ability, plus a firm-specific effect.  
Our methodology has some interesting aspects which should be mentioned up front. In 
the first place, it has the advantage of not relying exclusively on switchers to capture 
unobserved effects, which means that we avoid any bias arising from endogenous mobility. 
Secondly, our treatment allows the estimation of worker effects without running the risk of 
contamination from firm unobserved effects. Finally, our proposed route is easy to implement 
in standard packages such as STATA. 
To test our modelling, we use an original 2-period (year) longitudinal LEED dataset, 
comprising of more than 400 thousands workers and 1,500 firms in each year, and focus on 
two main sets of separate individuals – stayers and switchers. According to our estimates, the 
correlation between observed and unobserved attributes implies an upward bias in the 
standard (OLS) ‘return to education’ of roughly 80 percent. Returns to training and labor 
market experience in standard OLS seem also highly contaminated by the omission of 
unobserved heterogeneity. In turn, our results point to a substantial reduction in the gender 
gap once worker and firm effects are taken into account. 
The sensitivity of the results is examined using Monte-Carlo simulation and 
bootstrapping. We also apply the original AKM methodology to our data to obtain some 
useful benchmarking.  
This article is organised as follows. In the next section we present the modelling 
strategy and in the third section we describe the construction of our longitudinal LEED 
dataset and the corresponding subsamples of stayers and switchers. Section 4 presents the 
results and a whole set of robustness tests, including Monte-Carlo and bootstrap. The main 
conclusions are drawn in section 5.  
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2. Modelling  
2.1 Measuring worker and firm unobserved heterogeneity 
Let us start with a standard Mincer (1974) formulation in which the individual (log) 
wage is a function of a set of (observable) employee and employer attributes, that is:  
( )  ,                                                                                                   (1.1)it it j i t itLn w X Z uβ γ= + +  
where  itLn w  denotes the logarithm of the wage of individual (worker) i. itX  is the vector of 
his/her observable characteristics, ( )j i tZ  contains the observable characteristics of firm j – the 
firm in which worker i is employed in period t – and itu  denotes the error term.
1
 Clearly, in 
model (1.1) itu  is not necessarily independent and identically distributed as it includes 
unobservable characteristics of workers and firms that may well be correlated with the 
observed variables X and Z. 
Based on equation (1.1), the expected value of the wage of worker i, conditional on X 
and Z, is given by ( )( ) ,it it j i tE Ln w X Z , while the corresponding error is given by:  
( )( )  , .                                                                                        (1.2)it it it it j i tu Ln w E Ln w X Z= −   
 In turn, the log average wage in firm j, jtwLn , can be formulated as a function of 
observable firm characteristics, Zjt,  and average characteristics of workers, jtX ,  giving: 
  ,                                                                                                     (1.3)jtjt jt jtLn w X Zβ γ υ= + +
with 
1
  
jtN
itjt
i jt
wLn w Ln
N
=
= ∑  and 
1
jtN
itjt
i jt
XX
N
=
=∑ .2 
 Using model (1.3), the mathematical expectation of the average earnings in a given 
firm, ( ) ,jtjt jtE Ln w X Z , will of course depend on X  and Z, while the corresponding errors 
are given by  
( )  , .                                                                                        (1.4)jtjt jtjt jtLn w E Ln w X Zυ = −
 
 In this context, it is fair to assume that the difference between what a worker is 
entitled to receive, given X and Z, and the expected firm average wage, conditional on X  and 
                                                 
1
 The log wage empirical distribution is, in general, very close to a normal distribution (Card, 1999, Ch. 30). This 
specification also offers a ready-to-use interpretation, especially with respect to the ‘return to education’. 
2
 Njt is the number of workers in firm j in period t.  Equation (1.3) follows from (A1.1) in Appendix A1. 
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Z, or ( ) ( )( ) ,  ,jtjtit it j i t jtE Ln w X Z E Ln w X Z− , depends on the gap between worker’s 
observed attributes and the mean attributes of his/her counterparts in the same firm. Under 
this assumption, we expect, on average, that a worker with a higher schooling level than 
his/her average co-worker, for example, will have a higher wage. 
Let us then assume that, for individual i, we have 
( ) ( )( )   ,  , .                                                 (1.5)jtjt jtit it it j i t jtLn w Ln w E Ln w X Z E Ln w X Z− > −
 
Under the assumption that the set of observed variables is sufficiently representative of 
both individual and firm characteristics, one may hypothesize that the inequality (1.5) holds if 
there is any gap between unobserved ability of worker i and the average unobserved ability in 
firm j.3   
 Let us now assume that iα  is the (time-invariant) innate ability of worker i, while ( )j iφ  
is the (time-invariant) unobserved effect specific to firm j; ( )j iα  is the unobserved worker 
average ability in firm j in period t, with ( )
1
jtN
i
j i
i jtN
α
α
=
=∑ .  Then, using (1.2), we set: 
( )  t
( )
 (  | , )
    + .                                                                                                                         (1.6)
it it it it j i
i j i
u Ln w E Ln w X Z
α φ
 = − 
=
 
 On the other hand, the error from equation (1.4) can be explained by unobserved firm 
heterogeneity, jψ , in which case we have: 
 (  | , )
     = ,                                                                                                                                 (1.7)
jt jtjt jt jt
j
Ln w E Ln w X Zυ
ψ
 = − 
 
with jψ  = jα  + jφ . (A normal error term can be easily added to formulations (1.6) and (1.7).)
 Under these assumptions, we can now give a clear interpretation to inequality (1.5) as 
we have 
                                                 
3
 While innate ability cannot be directly measured, we know how it is rewarded. ‘Value’ and ‘volume’ in this 
framework are equivalent. 
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( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
(   ) (  | , ) (  | , )
     (  | , )  (  | , )
    ( ) ( )
    ( ) ( ) ( ).             
jt jtit it it j i t jt jt
jt jtit it it j i t jt jt
i j i j i
i j i j i j i i j i
Ln w Ln w E Ln w X Z E Ln w X Z
Ln w E Ln w X Z Ln w E Ln w X Z
α φ ψ
α φ α φ α α
 
− − − 
  = − − −   
= + −
= + − + = −                                                               (1.8)
 
Clearly, (1.5) holds if and only if )(iji αα > , which means that any worker with a 
higher unobserved human capital than the average co-worker in firm j will be expected to 
have a higher wage. To simplify the notation we will make ( )i i j iθ α α≡ − . 
In what follows, we will assume that ( )j iα  is also time-invariant, which of course 
makes jψ  time-invariant as well. Meanwhile, we note that relaxing this assumption produces 
no material changes in the results.4  
 
2.2 Estimation  
Let us now recap by considering the data generator process implicit in equation (1.6), 
that is:  
( ) ( )  .                                                                                   (2.1)it it j i t i j i itLn w X Zβ γ α φ ε= + + + +
 
 
This model follows directly from equation (1.1), under the assumption that the error 
term, itu , is given by ( )it i j i itu α φ ε= + + . This data generating process for individual earnings 
is similar to the one used in AKM.  
 Considering the logarithmic of the average wage in firm j, we have: 
  .                                                                                         (2.2)jtjt jjt j jtLn w X Zβ γ α φ ω= + + + +
 
which, in turn, is equivalent to model (1.3) under .jt j j jtυ α φ ω= + +  
 The error terms in models (2.1) and (2.2) are assumed to have the following properties:  
2
~ (0, )it IID εε σ ; 2~ (0, )jt IID ωω σ ;  ( ), , , 0E X Z D Fε =  and ( ), , , 0E X Z D Fω = ,  
                                                 
4
 Indeed, an alternative modelling with a non-constant ( )j iα  term generates similar results. In particular, the 
correlation between the unobservable effects obtained from the two alternatives is very high, at 0.90 and 0.86, in 
the case of  iθ and  jψ , respectively.  
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where D  denotes a NT N×  matrix of dummies that identify the worker over T periods and 
F  is a JT J× matrix of dummies representative of firms. N denotes the number of workers in 
the dataset, J  the number of firms, and T the length of the time series. 
Estimation of model (2.1) by OLS faces two major obstacles. The first one has to do 
with the possible correlation between observable characteristics, X and Z, and unobserved 
heterogeneity, iα  and ( )j iφ . Indeed, both the standard Hausman test and the F-statistic test 
reject the null of no correlation between the unobservable effects and the regressors X and Z.5 
The second major difficulty arising from applying OLS to (2.1) is the non-orthogonality of iα  
and ( )j iφ .  
Our empirical approach is as follows. Firstly, we use equation (2.1) and note that  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,                                                            (2.3)it it j i t j i j i it i j iLn w X Zβ γ φ α ε α α− + + + + = −
 
which, under the assumption that iθ  is given by ji αα − , is equivalent to have 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).                                                                       (2.4)i it it j i t j i j i itLn w X Zθ β γ φ α ε= − + + + +
 
 In turn, by manipulating (2.2), we get 
( ) .                                                                                  (2.5)jtj jtj jt jtLn w X Zφ α β γ ω+ = − + −
 
and, substituting (2.5) into (2.4), we finally have  
( )( )
( ) ( )
( )( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
   
( )   ,                                                    (2.6)
j ij i ti it it j i t j i t j i t it
j i tj i ti it it j i t it
Ln w X Z Ln w X Z
Ln w Ln w X X
θ β γ β γ ω ε
θ β ω ε
= − + + − + − −
= = − − − + −
 
which is equivalent to (1.8).6  
 In particular, we note that equation (2.6) may also take the form 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )  ,                                                        (2.7)j i tj i tit it i it j i tLn w Ln w X X β θ ε ω− = − + + −
which means that the wage gap ( )( )  j i titLn w Ln w−  can be explained by the difference in 
observed characteristics ( )( )j i titX X−  and by iθ  (or ji αα − ), plus a stochastic term, ε ω− . 
                                                 
5
 The F-statistic test is used to find the statistical significance of γ in the regression of an auxiliary model given 
by   (1 ) ( ) ( )iy y x x x x eit it i it iλ λ µ λ β γ− = − + − + − + (see Johnston and Dinardo, 1997, p. 404). 
6
 An alternative route to obtain (2.6) is of course to subtract (2.2) from (2.1). 
8 
In matrix notation, the equation (2.7) is equivalent to 
( ) ( ) ( ) ,                                                                           (2.8)j jLW LW X X Dβ θ ε ω− = − + + −
 
with ( )( ) 0it j i tE ε ω =  and ( ) 2 2( ) ~ (0, )it j i t IID ε ωε ω σ σ− + .7   
 Multiplying equation (2.8) by D DM I P= − , where DP  denotes the matrix that provides 
an orthogonal projection in D , we obtain 
( ) ( ) ( ).                                                   (2.9)j jD D D DM LW LW M X X M D Mβ θ ε ω− = − + + −
 
 By definition, we have 0DM Dθ = , and therefore  
( ) ( ) ( ) ,                                                              (2.10)j jD D DM LW LW M X X Mβ ε ω− = − + −
 
which yields the same estimates and residuals as model (2.8).8  We also note that the first 
element of matrix ( )jDM LW LW− , for example, is given by  
( ) ( ) ( )(1),1 (1),21,1 1,2(1),11,1       ,                                   (2.10)'2
j j
j
Ln w Ln w Ln w Ln w
Ln w Ln w
− + −
− −
and that for ( )jDM X X− we have:9 
( ) ( ) ( )(1),1 (1),2(1),1
1 11 1
1,1 1,211
1,1 .                                                                              (2.10)''2
j j
j
x x x x
x x
− + −
− −
 
The corresponding estimator of β  can be then written as 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 .                                            (2.11)T Tj j j jD DX X M X X X X M LW LWβ − = − − − − 
 
 
 From equation (2.8) we also have  
( ) ( ) ( ) ,                                                                         (2.12)j jLW LW X X Dβ θ ε ω− − − = + −
 
which means that the associated ˆθ  can be written as   
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 .                                                                       (2.13)j jT TD D D LW LW X Xθ β−= − − −
 
                                                 
7
 These assumptions indicate that both the variance of the error term in (2.8) and the variance-covariance of β  
and θ  depend on the variance of the error terms in models (2.1) and (2.2). 
8
 According to the Frisch and Waugh theorem. 
9
 
1
1,1x  denotes the first observable variable from worker 1 in period 1.  
9 
 Finally, we tackle the unobserved firm heterogeneity issue. Thus, using equation (2.5) 
and making jj jψ α φ= + , we have 
( ) .                                                                                        (2.14)jtjtj jt jtLn w X Zψ β γ ω= − + −
 
 
In matrix notation, equation (2.14) becomes  
.                                                                                               (2.15)j j jLW X Z Fβ γ ψ ω= + + +
 
where, we recall, F  is a ( JT J× ) matrix of dummies flagging the J firms. 
 Consider now the matrix of orthogonal projection in F , 1( )T TFP F F F F−= , and  the 
matrix MF , given by F FM I P= − . Multiplying equation (2.15) by FM , we have: 
,                                                                 (2.15)'j j jF F F F FM LW M X M Z M F Mβ γ ψ ω= + + +
 
where the first element of the matrix FM Z , for example, is given by 
1 1
1,1 1,21
1,1 2
z z
z
+
− .
10
  
 By definition, we have 0FM Fψ = , which means that the estimator of γ  can be written 
as: 
 ( ) ( )1 .                                                                                  (2.16)j jT TF FZ M Z Z M LW Xγ β−= −
 
  Substituting βˆ  and γˆ  into equation (2.15) we finally have 
 
 ( )  ( )1' .                                                                                (2.17)j jT T jF F F LW X Zψ β γ−= − −
 
 Now we elaborate further on the case where Z contains some time-invariant 
characteristics. We note first that by pre-multiplying (2.15) by the matrix FM , we are in 
practice getting rid of all time-invariant (observed) firm-specific characteristics (e.g. sector, 
legal status, and location). This implies that  'jψ  in (2.17) will not only capture the 
unobserved firm effect but also the effect of time-invariant (observed) firm characteristics. 
Since we only want to capture jψ , that is, the contribution of (time-invariant) unobserved 
firm characteristics, model (2.17) is not appropriate. 
 Let us then denote the subset of time-invariant firm characteristics by 'jZ . Then, 
using  'jψ  (from (2.17)), we run the model 
                                                 
10
 
1
1,1z  ( 11,2z ) denotes the first characteristic of firm 1 in period 1 (2). 
10 

' ',                                                                                                                    (2.18)j j jZψ ψ κ= +
 
where jψ  denotes the unobserved effect of firms excluding time-invariant (observable) 
characteristics.11 Model (2.18) is estimated by feasible GLS using the estimated variance of 

'jψ  (denoted by 
2
jψσ ), obtained from (2.17) and noting that  ( ) 2 21T wF Fψσ σ−= .12 In 
particular, for firm j, we have 

2
2
j
w
jt
t
N
ψ
σ
σ =
∑
 (see Appendix A2). Using κˆ  and  'jψ  we are 
therefore in a position to have an estimate of jψ  by simply solving (2.18) in order to jψ .  
We finally note that one key aspect of our methodology is that neither  jψ  nor  'jψ  
depend on  iθ , which means that worker and firm unobservable effects are estimated 
separately.  
 
2.3 Unobservable heterogeneity among job switchers  
The methodology described in the previous section cannot be directly applied to a 
panel of job switchers. In this case, as it will be shown below, the fixed effects approach is 
not powerful enough to capture worker and firm unobserved effects.  
Let us consider that, in period 1, worker i is in firm j. Then, using equation (2.7), we 
have  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1( )1 ( )11 1 1 ( )1  .                                        (3.1)j ij i j ii i i i j iLn w Ln w X X β α α ε ω− = − + − + −
 
 In period 2, assuming worker i moves to firm s, we have 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )2( )2 ( )22 2 2 ( )2  .                                      (3.2)s is i s ii i i i s iLn w Ln w X X β α α ε ω− = − + − + −
 
Clearly, applying the fixed effects approach – or taking first differences – the derived 
model will contain an unknown element, that is, ( )2 ( )1s i j iα α− .  A direct extension of the 
                                                 
11
 This procedure is equivalent to the approach followed by AKM to distinguish the effect of (time-invariant) 
schooling from unobservable (time-invariant) worker attributes. 
12
 We use feasible GLS to deal with the eventual heteroscedasticity caused by firm-level aggregation. Andrews, 
Schank and Upward (2006) argue that robust OLS would be sufficient. 
11 
methodology described in section 2.1 will yield therefore biased results as the term 
( )2 ( )1s i j iα α−  will be simply assumed away. 
Let us start again with model (2.1) and consider an individual who is in firm j in 
period 1 and in firm s in period 2. Taking first differences, we have 
( ) ( ) ( )2 1 2 1 ( )2 ( )1 ( )2 ( )1 2 1  ( ) .                       (3.3)i i i i s i j i s i j i i iLn w Ln w X X Z Zβ γ φ φ ε ε− = − + − + − + −
 
This equation explains the difference in wages received by worker i in periods 1 and 2 
as a function of changes in his/her observable characteristics and observed and unobserved 
characteristics of firms s and j. (Note that the wage gap does not depend on iα  since this 
component is time-invariant.) 
In matrix notation, we have  
       ,                                                                                           (3.4)HLW HX HZ Pβ γ φ ε= + + +
 
where H is the first difference operator and P is a M J×  matrix, with 
,it lp  given by
13
 
,
1 if  denotes the enterprise where worker  is employed in period 
1 if  denotes the enterprise where worker  was employed in period 1
0 otherwise
it l
l i t
p l i t


= − −


 
From (3.4) we get an unbiased estimate of ,  β γ , and φ .14 Finally, considering two 
periods and using (2.1), we proxy iα  by the over time average of the two estimated individual 
effects, that is:  
  ( )   ( )( )1 ( )21 1 ( )1 2 2 ( )21   .                       (3.5)2 j i s ii i i j i i i s iLn w X Z Ln w X Zα β γ φ β γ φ = − − − + − − − 
 
Thus, the parameter iα  will be given by the over time average wage unexplained by 
the observable characteristics of workers nor by the characteristics (observable and not 
observable) of firms at which workers have been employed.   
 
 
                                                 
13 M is the number of switchers. 
14
 See Wooldridge (2002, Ch.10).  
12 
2.4 Computing the size of the bias 
The standard Mincerian approach looks at the relationship between individual 
earnings and individual attributes, controlling for firm characteristics. Based on the 
developments in sections 2.1 and 2.2, we want, in particular, to assess the impact on the rate 
of return of typical covariates (e.g. schooling and training) after controlling directly for 
unobserved worker and firm heterogeneity. To this end, we will use the model 
( ) ( )  ,                                                                                  (4.1)it it j i t i j i itLn w X Zβ γ θ ψ ε= + + + +
 
which is identical to model (2.1) as, by definition, i j i jθ ψ α φ+ = + , and then, assuming away 
all unobserved effects, we run ordinary least squares on the model 
( )  ' ' '.                                                                                                  (4.2)it it j i t itLn w X Zβ γ ε= + +
 
 To obtain the unbiased estimates of β  and γ , we then add iθˆ  and ( )ˆ j iψ  and re-run the 
model 
 
( ) ( )  .                                                                                  (4.3)i j iit it j i t itLn w X Zθ ψ β γ ε− − = + +
 
By comparing the results from these two models – that is, ˆβ  with ˆ 'β  (and γˆ  with ˆ 'γ ) 
– we will be in a position to measure the bias resulting from the omission of unobservable 
(worker and firm) heterogeneity. Clearly, in this framework, ˆβ  and γˆ  will be conditional on 
X and Z, but also on θˆ  and ψˆ . Given models (2.1) and (2.2), and the corresponding 
assumptions on ε  and ω , both  θˆ  and ψˆ  are unbiased, but even if θˆ  and ψˆ  are biased, 
problems will arise only if ˆ( )θ θ−  and ˆ( )ψ ψ− are correlated with X or Z, a possibility that 
seems unlikely.  
  
3. Data 
Our linked employer-employee dataset (LEED) was obtained by matching the 
information from Quadros de Pessoal (worker-level information) and Balanço Social (firm-
level information), both from Gabinete de Estudos e Planeamento (GEP) of the Ministry of 
Labor, Portugal. The matching was made using firm’s (and worker’s) unique identification 
13 
number which allowed us to match individuals and firms not only in a given year but also 
longitudinally. Our raw LEED data, in particular, contains two data points (1998 and 1999), 
covering approximately 900,000 workers, employed in some 2,200 firms with at least 100 
employees.15 
Information on firm characteristics is mainly extracted from Balanço Social, and it 
includes value added, the wage bill, number of employees, location (five regions of 
continental Portugal), sectoral activity (twenty seven sectors), and legal status (three 
categories). Balanço Social also contains information on average characteristics of workers 
such as age, gender, schooling, tenure, and skill. A key feature of Balanço Social is that it 
contains unique information on firm-provided training, namely the number of training 
sessions, the number/share of training participants by occupation level, the number of training 
hours and the corresponding training costs (direct and indirect). Each of these items are 
subdivided in on-the-job and off-the job training categories. 
In turn, the information on individual worker attributes is extracted from Quadros de 
Pessoal. It includes monthly earnings, hours of work, age, gender, schooling level, skill, 
tenure, job occupation, and whether the individual is a full or part-time worker, inter al.16 
Based on the detailed information on training at firm level (from Balanço Social), we also 
used a model to impute training participation at worker level. (This procedure is available 
upon request from the authors.) 
Our estimation sample was obtained by applying several filters to the raw data. In 
particular, we dropped part-time workers and all individuals who were younger than 16 years 
old or older than 65. (There are some 100,000 part-time workers in the raw sample.) 
Apprentices and individuals with earnings less than the statutory minimum wage were also 
eliminated, as well as those who were employed in firms located in Madeira and Açores. 
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 A total of 535,254 individuals were observed in both sample years, while 178,435 were only observed in 1998 
and 182,996 in 1999. 
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 Quadros de Pessoal contains information on basic and total earnings, with the latter being obtained by adding 
to basic earnings other elements such as compensation for night shifts and productivity bonus. Typically, total 
earnings show greater cross-section and over time variability. Quadros de Pessoal also contains information on 
firm characteristics which were used for double-checking proposes. As described in Appendix Table 1, our 
selected earnings measure is total earnings. 
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After applying these filters, and eliminating all observations in which at least one selected 
variable is missing, we ended up with a balanced panel of 401,258 individuals who were 
observed consecutively.  
The summary statistics at individual and firm level are presented in Table 1. In the 
first place, we note that although our dataset should present, in principle, a comparatively 
lower degree of (observed) heterogeneity – no firm in the sample has less than 100 workers, 
we recall – there is a considerable dispersion in earnings. In fact, using column (1) of the 
table, we obtain a coefficient of variation of approximately 0.4, while, for example, in 
Germany this indicator is only 0.1.17 Worker-level means of the selected characteristics are 
also typically different from firm-level means, while the standard deviation of the variables 
earnings, age, schooling, and tenure in column (2) are roughly ½ of the corresponding value 
in column (1), an indication that there is a sizeable sorting of individuals across firms. 
Table 2 gives the summary statistics of our estimation samples: in column (1), we 
have the subsample of individuals who are in the same firm in 1998 and 1999, and, in column 
(2), the subsample of switchers, that is, those individuals who were employed in different 
firms in two consecutive years. We note that from the initial set of 401 thousand individuals 
in Table 1, some 382 thousand are stayers, while 19 thousand are switchers. Then, due to 
missing observations on the selected variables, we lost an additional total of 20 thousand 
stayers to end up with 357,081 useable observations in Sample 1. The number of switchers 
also turned up to be much lower than the initial 19 thousand. Indeed, a closer inspection of the 
data in 1998 and 1999 reveals that a sizeable fraction of these individuals do stay in the same 
firm, being the firm identification code different exclusively due to changes in firm activity 
classification and ownership. (Mergers and acquisitions are generally at the root of the 
problem.)  These cases were detected by looking carefully at the worker tenure variable, on 
the one hand, and at firm labor turnover rates, on the other, and by observing massive worker 
flows across two (artificially) distinct firms. (Other time-invariant firm characteristics were 
also checked to be absolutely sure about our procedures.)  All individuals associated to these 
artificial worker flows were dropped from our sample of switchers.18  
According to Abowd, Creecy and Kramarz (2002), the identification of firm (and 
worker) effects should be computed within a ‘connected’ group of workers and firms. Thus, 
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 See, for example, Addison, Teixeira and Zwick (2009), Table 1A. 
18
 The final set of switchers is therefore substantially smaller than the original sample. This seemingly drop 
shows quite emphatically how sensitive is worker mobility data in practice. 
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applying their procedure to our sample of switchers, we created a first workers/firms group 
that includes all the switchers who were employed in any firm in the group at some point over 
the sample period and all the firms at which at least one of the individuals in the group was 
ever employed. In a second step, we selected all the workers employed in those firms. 
Similarly, for the second, third, …, groups, the condition being that the intersection between 
any pair of groups ought to be empty either in terms of individuals or firms. In our case, only 
25 workers of the initial sample of switchers did not belong to the first group (say Group 1) as 
they were not connected to any firm in the group. By the same token, a total of 17 firms were 
excluded from Group 1 as they never employed any worker in the group.19 Based on this 
procedure, we ended up with a final sample of 4,069 switchers (i.e. 99% of a total of 4,094 
individuals) and 802 firms. The corresponding summary statistics are presented in Table 2, 
column (2). Clearly, worker mobility is non-random, as switchers do present a set of attributes 
quite distinct from the characteristics of stayers. In particular, switchers are younger and have 
higher levels of schooling than stayers. They also seem to have participated more often in 
training. Worker mobility seems also to be more concentrated in Lisboa and Vale do Tejo, in 
large firms, and in the service sector. (This information is not reported in the Table.)  
 
4. Results  
4.1 Unobservable characteristics of workers  
Table 3 shows the summary statistics of ˆiθ , obtained from model (2.13). We note that, 
by definition, the mean of ˆiθ  is equal to zero. The median, in turn, is slightly negative which 
is due to the fact that the median of the log wage distribution is slightly below the mean. (The 
kurtosis and skewness are equal to 7.58 and 1.61, respectively; see Figure 1.) The standard 
deviation of ˆiθ , at 0.33, also confirms the presumption that unobserved heterogeneity across 
workers is quite substantial. Finally, we note that the computed value for the standard 
deviation is very close to the one reported by AKM, who found in their study a standard 
deviation of 0.40, for Men, and 0.38, for Women (AKM, Table IV).  
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 As a matter of fact, the procedure generated seven additional groups: Group 2, with 9 workers and 4 firms; 
Group 3, with 5 workers and 2 firms; Group 4, with 3 workers and 3 firms; and Groups 5, 6, 7, and 8, with 2 
workers and 2 firms per group. 
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The correlation between observed and unobserved ability is given in Table 4. The high 
correlation coefficients shown in this table confirms of course that the hypothesis of 
orthogonality between unobservable and observable characteristics is unrealistic. This is 
particularly visible when we look at the correlation between schooling and ˆiθ , at 0.41. 
Clearly, individuals with above average unobserved ability have higher levels of schooling, 
which of course implies that estimates from regressions that do not control for unobserved 
heterogeneity will seriously overestimate the impact of schooling on earnings. Although to a 
lesser degree, training is positively correlated with ability, which also confirms that there is 
also self-selection into training. In turn, the correlation between ˆiθ  and labor market 
experience is negative. One interpretation for this result is that younger workers have perhaps 
higher innate abilities.20 As expected, the unobservable component of human capital is highly 
positively correlated with earnings, at 0.59.21  
In a separate exercise (not reported in the Table), we computed the correlation 
between ˆiθ  and the difference between each individual (observable) attribute and the 
corresponding firm average. For the schooling variable, for example, this correlation is equal 
to 0.47. The correlation in the case of other attributes is also very similar to the ones reported 
in Table 4. 
 
4.2 Unobservable characteristics of firms 
Table 5 contains the summary statistics of firm unobserved heterogeneity, ˆ jψ , which, 
as described in Section 2, includes two components, jα  and jφ . As it can be seen, both the 
mean and the median of ˆ jψ  are negative at worker level. The corresponding statistics at firm 
level are even more negative (not presented in the Table) which suggests that workers are 
slightly concentrated in firms with a higher than average unobserved ability. 
                                                 
20
 The negative correlation between unobserved ability and experience is also reported by Abowd, Lengrmann 
and McKinney (2003). 
21
 In AKM this coefficient is slightly higher, at 0.73. This is not surprising as their set of observables attributes is 
much narrower than ours. 
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ˆ jψ  is expected to be correlated with observable firm attributes, X  and Z . The 
corresponding correlation coefficients are presented in Table 6. Since, by definition, ˆ jψ  
contains the average innate abilities of workers in the firm, it should not be surprising to find 
that unobserved ability of firms is positively correlated with schooling, training and skills, for 
example, and negatively correlated with experience.22 
 The correlation between ˆiθ  and unobservable characteristics of firms, ˆ jψ , is slightly 
negative, at -0.004 (it is statistically different from zero, at a significance level of 0.01 or 
better). We note that this negative relation does not imply that high-ability workers are in low-
ability firms, which would be counter-intuitive. The following example illustrates our point. 
Let us suppose, for example, that worker i, employed in a firm with a high jα , has a high iα . 
In this case, the difference between iα  and jα  (or iθ ) although positive is presumably small. 
Assuming jφ  is also high, we have then a large jψ  and a small iθ , and therefore a negative 
correlation between iθ  and jψ , while iα  and jφ are actually positively correlated. 
The relation between the earnings firm average and observed and unobserved 
characteristics is presented on Table 7. The critical component in terms of wage determination 
seems to be the average unobservable characteristics of firms, with a correlation coefficient of 
0.72. Time-invariant firm (observed) characteristics are also very important at 0.65, while the 
correlation between observable characteristics of workers and firm average wages is 
somewhat lower at 0.46 (row 2). 
 
4.3 Unobserved ability in the case of switchers 
Now we consider the case of switchers. We recall that by looking at this particular 
sample, we want to obtain the innate ability ˆiα , and not just ˆiθ . Another implication is that 
the unknown firm fixed effect,  jφ , can also be obtained. 
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 The sign of the corresponding correlation coefficient is the same as in Table 4. 
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The summary statistics for the sample of switchers is given in Table 8. Clearly, the 
standard deviation of the unobservable worker heterogeneity in this subsample is larger than 
in Table 3. This is an expected result since the standard deviation of ˆiθ  measures, by 
definition, how individual innate attributes deviate from the firm average, while the standard 
deviation of  iα  measures simply the dispersion in individual unobserved ability.   
Table 9 gives the correlation between  iα  and worker characteristics, iX . The absolute 
value of the correlation coefficient between the unobservable heterogeneity and the 
observable characteristics in this subsample is generally higher than those reported in Table 4.  
In Table 10 we compute the correlation between ˆiθ  (and ˆ jψ ) and worker and firm 
specific effects,  iα  (and  jφ ), using the sample of switchers. In the first place, it seems that ˆiθ  
captures most of the individual unobserved effect  iα  as the correlation coefficient, in the third 
cell of the table (column 1), is equal to 0.8417. We observe though a weaker relation between 
unobserved ability of switchers and unobservable characteristics of firms as the coefficient of 
correlation between  iα  and  jφ  is 0.2315. But this relation is stronger if the unobservable firm 
effect includes jα .23 In this case, the correlation between  iα and  jψ is equal to 0.3807.  
As can be observed in Table 11, the correlation between the firm average wage and 
unobserved attributes are very similar to those obtained using the sample of stayers, although 
the correlation with the observable characteristics seems to be higher for switchers: 0.84 (for 
workers characteristics) and 0.34 (for firms characteristics) – Table 11 – and 0.46 and 0.15, 
respectively – Table 7.  
Since we computed  jφ  using only workers who change jobs (switchers) it is possible 
that, for some firms, this parameter is being obtained using too few observations per firm. To 
circumvent this problem, we followed AKM and pooled all firms with less than 10 
observations in a single entity. The resulting sample comprised 176 firms (115 firms in the 
case of AKM, just to keep our exercise in perspective). The results from this experiment are 
reported on Appendix Tables A2 and A3. There is, in the first place, less dispersion in  jφ  - 
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 Which means there is also a positive relation between unobserved heterogeneity of worker i and innate 
attributes of his/her co-workers. 
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the standard deviation is now 0.17 (in Table A2, column 2) rather than 0.28 (in Table 8, 
column 2). Summary statistics of  iα  and the correlation with X  are practically the same. In 
turn, the first column of Appendix Table A3 reproduces the results of model (4.2), while the 
second column presents results of model (4.3) using the ‘pooled’ data. As it can be seen, 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity further reduces the rate of return to schooling and 
training, while tenure and experience somewhat increased their impact.  
 
4.4 Labor market return rates after controlling for unobserved worker and firm effects 
Tables 12 and 13 contain the results of models (4.2) and (4.3), in columns (1) and (2), 
respectively. In Table 12 the two models are applied to Sample 1 (stayers), whereas in Table 
13 we report the results from Sample 2 (switchers). In the first column of both tables there is 
no control for unobserved ability, while in the second we account for unobserved worker and 
firm effects. In this context, the difference in parameter estimates between columns (1) and 
(2) gives an indication of the magnitude of the bias in standard OLS earnings equations. 
Firstly, in column (1) of Table 12, there is confirmation of the familiar result (Becker, 
1962), that the investment in human capital, either general or specific, does pay off, as higher 
levels of schooling, labor market experience, tenure, and training result in higher wages. 
Interestingly enough, even after controlling for a wide array of worker and firm observable 
attributes (a total of 47 regressors), the model without control for unobserved ability still 
shows a substantial gender gap of approximately 15%. The overall fitness of the model, given 
by the
2
,R  is 74%. 
Column (2) gives the corresponding parameter estimates after controlling for the 
unobserved components estimated in sections 4.1 and 4.2. Not surprisingly, taking into 
account the unobserved heterogeneity yields a substantial increase in the explanatory power 
of the model (the 2R  is equal to 0.91 in Sample 1).  
In Table 12, the obvious change from column (1) to column (2) is the reduction on the 
rate of return to standard indicators of general and specific human capital – schooling, 
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training, experience, skills, and tenure. The first conclusion to draw is therefore that the 
standard earnings regression in column (1) crudely overestimates the return rate to standard 
measures of human capital. In particular, OLS estimates imply an overestimation of the 
returns to schooling of approximately 80%. In other words, 80% of the impact of the marginal 
rate of return to schooling (in column (1)) is not due to schooling per se.24 
The results reported in Table 13, in turn, suggest that worker mobility generates 
somewhat different rates of return to observed characteristics. But most conclusions drawn 
from Table 12 hold rather well. In particular, it confirms that the acquisition of human capital 
matters and that standard OLS estimates are greatly overstated. Another interesting aspect is 
that workers seem to have more incentive to change jobs if they have higher innate abilities 
than their co-workers. In fact, and although we do not report this result in our tables, the 
results from a fairly parsimonious probit model show that the probability of a worker being a 
switcher is higher if he/she has lower tenure and a higher ˆiθ .  
 
4.5. Robustness 
4.5.1 Outliers, homoscedasticity, and omission of relevant variables 
As a first pass, we investigate the presence of outliers by comparing actual and 
predicted wages (using model 4.2). Differences between predicted and actual earnings were 
within an interval which is smaller than five times the value of the standard deviation. Using 
this criterion (see also AKM) there seems to be no indication that the presence of outliers is 
an issue in our regressions.  
To test for the presence of heteroscedasticity, we run the model  
( )2 ,                                                                                                             (5.1)it it itH eε α ϕ= + +
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 The schooling level is generally considered a good predictor to employers in terms of expected worker effort 
and motivation; and individuals with higher innate attributes are expected to select themselves into higher levels 
of schooling. The coefficient of schooling in the first column of Table 12 reflects of course this self-selection 
effect. It is worthwhile to note however that only a fraction of the observed reduction is due to worker 
unobserved ability. Indeed, if we ignore firm unobserved effects, the schooling coefficient reduces only to 0.025, 
versus 0.010 when both effects are controlled for. 
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where H denotes the set of explanatory variables (including their cross-products and squares). 
Then, we compute the statistic 2nR , which follows (asymptotically) a Chi-Square with 85 
degrees of freedom. (This is the White test, which is a particular case of the Breusch-Pagan 
test, Greene, p. 222-223.) For model (4.2), the corresponding Chi-Square (with 85 d.f.) is 
equal to 2 623.85iχ =  ( 2 0.000iP χ> = ), which means that the null is comfortably rejected and, 
hence, that the variance of the error term depends on the values of the explanatory variables. 
This result should not be surprising as unobservable heterogeneity of workers and firms are 
expected to be correlated with the observable variables included in the regression. For model 
(4.3), we have 2 91.55iχ =  ( 2 0.025iP χ> = ), which means that the hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity cannot be easily rejected. 
As a further checking we played with the robust option available in STATA to relax 
the assumption of errors being IID in model (4.3), and we virtually obtained the same 
statistical significance on the estimated coefficients. 
Regarding the omission of relevant variables in our specifications, the Ramsey Reset 
test for model (4.2) gives (1;8,102) 208.53F =  ( 0.0000F estP F> = ), while for model (4.3) we 
obtain (1;8,102) 0.56F =  ( 0.6405F estP F> = ). This result indicates that our treatment of the 
unobserved effects was successful in removing the omitted variable problem. No evidence of 
multicolinearity was detected as the variance inflation statistical test is in most cases lower 
than 5 and, except for sectoral dummies (which, in principle, are correlated to each other), 
always lower than 10. 
 
4.5.2 Replicating AKM 
It also seems to be appropriate at this stage to replicate the original AKM methodology 
using our data. The starting point is a model as the one formulated in section 2.2 above 
(equation 2.1). Thus, let us take the model25  
,                                                                                                          (6.1)Y X D Fβ θ ψ ε= + + +
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 For convenience, we will use the AKM notation. We note, however, that in AKM the variables Y and X 
denote deviations from the grand mean. 
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where θ  and ψ  denote worker and firm unobserved effects. Then, making 
1( ) ( )T TZ Z zF P M F Z Z Z Z F M Fψ ψ ψ ψ−= + = +  and setting 1( )T TZ Z Z Fλ ψ−≡ , we have 
,                                                                                            (6.2)zY X D Z M Fβ θ λ ψ ε= + + + +
 
where Z  is an artificial set of regressors obtained by interacting observed worker and firm 
characteristics; ZP  denotes the matrix that provides an orthogonal projection in Z , and 
Z ZM I P= − . Finally, under  0 and 0,T Tz zX M F D M F= =  equation (6.2) can be given by:  
 .                                                                                                        (6.3)Y X D Zβ θ λ ε= + + +
 
 In practice, this approach amounts to use Z to capture the correlation between the 
unobservable effects of firms and all observed and unobserved variables. Assuming then that 
the unobservable heterogeneity of workers is time-invariant, the fixed effects approach is 
applied to obtain β  and λ , being the associated estimator of θ  given by:26  
 ( )  1 ( ).                                                                                             (6.4)T TD D D Y X Zθ β λ−= − −
 
 Finally, to compute firm effects, AKM provide two alternative estimation methods: 
‘the order-independent’ and ‘the order-dependent’. (The acronym is due to the fact that, in the 
former, worker and firm effects are estimated separately, while in the latter worker effects are 
estimated before firm effects or vice-versa.)   
In the order-independent estimation case, AKM use the assumption that the correlation 
across the independent variables of model (6.1) is captured by the matrix Z, to then compute 
firm unobserved effects, ψ , using the model 
,                                                                                                                     (6.5)Y F Zψ pi ξ= + +
 
where pi  is computed via the orthogonal projection of variables from Z and the dependent 
variable on the null space of F. Pre-multiplying equation (6.5) by FM  with 
1( )T TFM I F F F F−≡ − , we get   
 1( ) ,                                                                                                           (6.6)T TF FZ M Z Z M Ypi −=
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 One limitation of this approach is that the ˆθ  will contain the unobserved worker ability and any time-invariant 
worker attribute (e.g. schooling). A remedy is to use feasible GLS to separate the unobserved ability from the 
schooling effect. 
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and therefore we have:  
 ( )1( ) .                                                                                                    (6.7)T Tj F F F Y Zψ pi−= −
 
In turn, worker effects are estimated independently using (6.4). 
 The ‘approach of order dependent’ in its ‘worker first’ version uses the parameter 
estimates obtained in (6.3) and (6.4) and sets  Y X D Fβ θ ψ ω− − = + . The associated 
estimator of ψ  is then given by 1 ˆ ˆˆ ( ) ( )T TF F F Y X Dψ β θ−= − − . (An alternative ‘firms first’ 
method can also be applied.)  
Table 14, column (1), presents the summary statistics for  iα  and  jψ , obtained by 
applying the AKM methodology to our data. Column (2) simply reproduces the AKM results 
(their Table IV). The reported estimates are for the male and female sub-samples.27 As it can 
be seen, the standard deviation of worker and firm unobserved effects (via the order-
independent method) are roughly of the same order of magnitude (rows 1 to 4). In contrast, 
the “order dependent” approach (rows 5 and 6) produces substantially lower dispersion in 
unobserved firm ability. In any case, differences on the distribution of unobserved 
heterogeneity across gender are small. The major difference between columns (1) and (2) is 
on the mean of  jψ  (in the order-dependent case), which tends to be slightly higher in column 
(1). This can be due to a higher share of large firms in our sample. Presumably, larger firms 
tend to concentrate a higher proportion of highly-skilled individuals.28 
One interesting aspect to mention is that the correlation between earnings and the 
estimated unobserved ability,  iα  and  jψ , is very similar in the two sets of results – columns 
(1) and (2) of Table 15). Schooling, for example, presents a higher correlation in our data at 
0.58 vs. 0.41 in AKM (Table 15, row 4, columns (1) and (2), respectively). 
The significance of the unobservable effects on the performance of firms was also 
analysed in AKM. In our case, although the impact of unobservable heterogeneity of workers 
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 In our replication, we selected a representative sample of stayers and switchers to obtain a total of 
approximately 8,000 individuals. 
28
 It is also instructive to compute the correlation between firm effects arising from each approach (order-
independent versus order-dependent cases). In our sample, the correlation is equal to 0.155, which of course 
suggest some degree of non-robustness across the two methods. 
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is stronger, either worker or firm effects have a positive impact on productivity. Firm fixed 
effects are also associated with a more intensive utilization of physical capital, while the 
worker effect seems to have a greater impact on firm operating income.   
We finally note that although our dataset has a much smaller number observations, the 
number of variables in our case is much larger than in AKM. The quality of the fit is therefore 
higher in our case – excluding the contribution of the unobservable effects, our model is able 
to explain more than 70% of the wage variation, while in AKM the quality of the fit does not 
exceed 30%. On the other hand, the fact that the set of worker attributes in AKM is restricted 
to experience and schooling imposes serious limitations on the estimation of the unobserved 
effects.  The richness of our data is therefore an important advantage as it allows the 
implementation of a modelling strategy which does not require computation of Z to estimate 
the parameters of interest. In any case, and despite having a much larger set of worker and 
firm characteristics, the null of the Hausman test, necessary to guarantee that Z captures the 
covariance between observed and unobserved worker characteristics and firm effects, is still 
rejected comfortably. Indeed, the corresponding 2iχ  statistic is equal to 11,176.40 (in AKM, 
the corresponding statistic is 21,000, p. 300). 
 
4.6. Parameter robustness using Monte Carlo simulation and bootstrapping 
Using simulation techniques, in this section we want to know how the reported point 
estimates ˆβ  and γˆ  in Tables 12 and 13 differ from the simulation mean and, in particular, 
how sensitive are the reported standard errors and the corresponding confidence intervals to 
various types of assumptions. 
We will use two alternative routes: the Monte Carlo simulation and the bootstrap. The 
former requires the full specification of the data generating process – that is, the knowledge of 
all explanatory variables, the unobserved effects ˆiθ  and ˆ jψ , and the distribution of the error 
term; the bootstrapping uses an estimated DGP based on the sample distribution (Davidson 
and MacKinnon, 2004, Ch. 4). In our procedure, we will use the non-parametric bootstrapping 
to relax the assumption of the error distribution, which amounts to estimate model (4.3) 
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multiple times by resampling observations from the original data. These observations are 
selected given a certain probability and such that the structure of the panel is preserved. 
For the Monte Carlo simulation, the estimated parameters are obtained from model 
(4.3), while the explanatory variables, X and Z, are assumed fixed. Firstly, we generate a 
random variable for the error term, itu , assuming (for stayers): ~ (0;0.015)itu N . Secondly, 
we generate N (sample size) values for the dependent variable,   i jit itLn w uθ ψ− − − , and 
estimate ˆ mβ  and ˆmγ , which of course will be conditional on ˆiθ  and ˆ jψ .29  By repeating the 
process B times, we then compute the average of ˆ mβ  and ˆmγ , which, in turn, by comparing 
with ‘observed’ ˆβ  and γˆ  from model (4.3), allow us to compute the magnitude of the bias in 
ˆβ  and γˆ .30 The sample variance obtained from the Monte Carlo simulations can also be used 
to generate confidence intervals. 
Another alternative to evaluate the sensitivity of ˆβ  and γˆ  is to consider that ˆiθ  
follows a normal distribution, while, at the same time, there is correlation between ˆiθ  and 
schooling. In this case, ˆiθ  will have the following distribution: 
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where M denotes the statistical average, 
^
ˆSθσ  is the covariance between ˆiθ  and schooling, and 
^
2σ  the estimated variance. Using the statistics obtained from the sample of stayers, this 
distribution is given by ( ) ( )( )ˆ ~ 0.033 7.91 ;0.092 .i i iSchooling N Schoolingθ −  To generate N 
values for the dependent variable, we then make   i jit itLn w uθ ψ− − −  and use the 
procedures described previously to obtain ˆ mβ  and ˆmγ .  
The results of the Monte Carlo simulation, considering ˆiθ  fixed and the sample of 
stayers, are reported in Table 16. Clearly, neither ˆβ  nor γˆ  seem to be sensitive to the selected 
parameter perturbation as the computed mean in column (1) is virtually identical to the point 
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ˆ
iθ  and ˆ jψ  are assumed fixed and equal to the parameters obtained in models (2.13) and (2.18). 
30
 The number of replications, B, must satisfy the rule ( )1 , B N Nα + = ∈ , where α  is the selected confidence level 
(Davidson and Mackinnon, 2004, Ch. 4). In our simulations, we set B = 999.  
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estimate reported in column (5). Moreover, the standard deviation in column (2) is in general 
identical to the standard error in column (5).  
As it can be seen in Table 17, the alternative modelling, in which ˆiθ  is assumed to be 
correlated with schooling, yields approximately the same conclusions. In particularly, the 
results in column (1) of Table 17 and column (2) of Table 12 are very similar. 
The results of the simulation process applied to the sample of switchers are presented 
in Table 18. We again conclude that under  iα  and  jφ  fixed the difference between the point 
estimate in column (5) and the corresponding sample mean is very small. The reported 
standard errors also seem to be quite robust to the assumed parameter perturbation. 
In Table 19 we present the results from a simulation procedure where  iα  is now 
correlated with schooling and follows  
( )( )^ ~ 0.076 9.95 ;0.116 .i i iSchooling N Schoolingα  − 
 
 We again conclude that the results 
obtained from assuming a non-fixed  iα  are very similar to those reported in Table 13.  
 The main weakness of the Monte Carlo simulation is that the assumed DGP may be a 
too strong assumption. To relax this assumption, we use an alternative non-parametric 
bootstrapping method (with replacement) in order to compute ˆ bβ  and ˆbγ  and the 
corresponding confidence intervals (b=1, 2, …B) for the parameters of the observed 
characteristics. Then, based on ˆβ  and γˆ  (i.e. the bootstrap sampling average of ˆ bβ  and ˆbγ ), 
we compute a possible measure of the bias, given by ˆ ˆjβ β− , and the corresponding standard 
deviation. 
As shown in Table 20, the bootstrap technique yields roughly the same results as the 
Monte Carlo. The bias is very small (see columns (1) and (5)). Using Efron’s criterion (Efron, 
1979), there is no evidence of any problematic bias as the computed bias is always smaller 
than 25%. We note that the 95 percent bootstrapped confidence intervals in columns (3) and 
(4) were obtained via three different methods: the first one (in row 1) considers that the 
distribution of the parameters is a normal distribution; the second (in row 2) is obtained by 
finding the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles; and the third (in row 3) is computed in a similar way of 
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the second, but taking into account the median bias. Clearly, the point estimates in column (6) 
fall within the estimated intervals reported in columns (3) and (4). 
To sum up the results contained in Tables 16-20, we can conclude that either ˆβ  and γˆ  
are not expected to diverge visibly from the estimates reported in Tables 12 and 13. Assuming 
that the hypothesis implicit either in the Monte Carlo and bootstrapping simulations are valid, 
there seems to be therefore not much evidence suggesting that ˆβ  and γˆ  in Tables 12 and 13 
are biased or inefficient.  
 
 
  5. Conclusions 
 Chief among the critical determinants of individual earnings is unmeasured ability of 
workers and firms. Given that unobserved heterogeneity is expected to be highly correlated 
with typical covariates in standard human capital earnings functions, proper control of worker 
and firm effects is crucial to avoid misleading inference on the role of human capital 
acquisition on earnings. 
Using an original LEED dataset, obtained from matching two Portuguese datasets 
(Quadros de Pessoal and Balanço Social), we develop in this paper a new approach which 
tries to take full advantage of a comprehensive array of longitudinal worker and firm 
characteristics available in our database, including detailed information on firm-provided 
training.  
Our modelling strategy assumes that i) the firm unobserved effect contains the worker 
average unobserved ability, plus a firm-specific effect; and ii) the gap between individual and 
firm average wages, unexplained by differences in observable characteristics, gives the extent 
to which the unobserved ability of a given individual deviates from the average of unobserved 
worker ability in the firm. Our procedure then enables us to evaluate the bias in standard OLS 
earnings regressions and analyse the relationship between unmeasured (innate) human capital 
and observable characteristics of workers and firms. 
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As expected, the standard human capital earnings function covariates (e.g. schooling, 
experience, and training) are highly correlated with worker and firm unobserved attributes. 
The main consequence of the correlation between observed and unobserved attributes is the 
existence of significant bias associated with selectivity effects. According to our estimates, 
ignoring worker and firm unobserved effects implies a substantial upward shift in the OLS 
‘return to education’. We were also able to confirm the negative correlation between 
unobserved ability and labour market experience obtained in other studies (e.g. Abowd, 
Lengrmann and McKinney, 2003). Not surprisingly, there is evidence that the correlation 
between wages and unobserved worker ability is much higher than the correlation between 
unobserved firm ability and wages.  
 Our analysis is conducted using two separate sets of individuals (stayers and 
switchers), and, despite obvious differences between these two sub-samples in terms of group 
composition (worker mobility is clearly non-random), the main results with respect to the role 
of unobserved ability on individual earnings seem to hold rather well, although apparently in 
a different order of magnitude. An interesting finding is that workers with above firm-average 
innate abilities seem to be the ones that actually change jobs. 
Evidence from Monte Carlo simulation and bootstrapping shows that our estimated 
rates of return to human capital do not seem to be sensitive to parameter perturbation. On the 
whole, our study does provide therefore further evidence that a comprehensive set of 
individual and firm characteristics is critical to understanding the role of human capital 
variables on individual earnings.  
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Table 1: Worker and firm level means, all workers, 1998-99 
  Worker level 
(1) 
Firm level  
(2) 
(log) Earnings 1.59 (0.60) 1.35 (0.42) 
Age (years) 40.69 (10.28) 38.55 (5.23) 
Fraction male 0.6460 0.6054 
Schooling (years) 7.93 (4.08) 7.35 (2.49) 
Tenure (years) 14.02 (9.99) 10.96 (5.84) 
Distribution by occupation level: 
 Top managers and professionals 
 Other managers and professionals 
 Foremen and supervisors 
 Highly skilled and skilled personnel 
 Semiskilled personnel 
 Unskilled personnel 
 
0.0641 
0.0504 
0.0674 
0.5583 
0.1699 
0.0837 
 
0.0580 
0.0577 
0.0621 
0.4309 
0.2267 
0.1228 
Fraction of trainees 0.5315 0.4110 
Distribution by location:   
   Norte 0.311 0.367 
  Centro 0.086 0.141 
  Lisboa e Vale do Tejo 0.586 0.460 
  Alentejo 0.012 0.013 
  Algarve 0.006 0.016 
Foreign ownership 0.280 0.234 
Proportion of full-time workers in the firm 0.9085 0.8779 
(log) Productivity 2.89 (1.04) 2.49 (0.88) 
Number or workers 401,258 401,258 
Number of firms 1,792 1,792 
Standard deviations in parenthesis. 
Note:  The description of the variables is presented in the Appendix Table A1. The sample comprises only 
workers who are observed in consecutive years (i.e. in 1998 and 1999).  
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Table 2: Worker level means in Sample 1 and Sample 2 (estimation samples, 1998-1999) 
 
Sample 1 (Stayers) 
(1) 
Sample 2 (Switchers) 
(2) 
(log) Earnings    1.59 (0.60) 1.47 (0.65) 
Age (years) 40.75 (10.26) 32.16 (8.31) 
Fraction male 0.6521 0.6611 
Schooling (years) 7.93 (4.05) 9.97 (4.04) 
Tenure (years) 14.26 (9.90) 2.47 (3.55) 
Distribution by occupation level: 
 Top managers and professionals 
 Other managers and professionals 
 Foremen and supervisors 
 Highly skilled and skilled personnel 
 Semiskilled personnel 
 Unskilled personnel 
 
0.0635 
0.0519 
0.0661 
0.5704 
0.1647 
0.0780 
 
0.0839 
0.0570 
0.0430 
0.4724 
0.1337 
0.2100 
Fraction of trainees 0.4998 0.5230 
Distribution by location:   
Norte 0.311 0.257 
Centro 0.084 0.042 
Lisboa e Vale do Tejo 0.589 0.685 
Alentejo 0.012 0.007 
Algarve 0.005 0.009 
Foreign ownership 0.286 0.367 
Proportion of full-time workers in the firm 0.9106 0.8773 
(log) Productivity 2.89 (1.04) 2.68 (1.01) 
Number or workers 357,081 4,069 
Number of firms 1,475 802 
Standard deviation in parenthesis. 
Note: See Table 1. 
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                        Table 3: Summary statistics of  iθ , Sample 1 (Stayers) 
Minimum -1.699 
Maximum 2.987 
Mean 0 
Median -0.068 
Standard deviation 0.331 
Number of observations 714,162 
   Note:  iθ  was obtained using model (2.13). 
 
  
 
 
 
                                  
Table 4: Correlation between observable attributes, iX , and unobservable worker ability,  iθ . 
Sample 1 (Stayers) 
 Coefficient 
Schooling 0.4052 
Tenure  -0.0378 
Experience -0.1007 
Training 0.2227 
Top managers and professionals 0.4966 
Other managers and professionals 0.2141 
Foremen and supervisors 0.1350 
Highly skilled and skilled personnel -0.1969 
Unskilled personnel -0.1765 
Unskilled workers -0.1478 
Gender (Male)  0.1160 
(log) Earnings 0.5940 
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 Table 5: Summary statistics of unobserved firm effects,  jψ , Sample 1 (Stayers) 
Minimum -0.792 
Maximum 1.159 
Mean -0.001 
Median -0.006 
Standard deviation 0.272 
Number of observations 714,162 
Note: This table reports the unobserved firm effect after excluding observable, time-invariant characteristics (see 
model (2.18)). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Correlation between  jψ  and firm average characteristics, X  and Z , Sample 1 
(Stayers)  
 Coefficient 
Schooling 0.4706 
Tenure 0.0022 
Experience  -0.1334 
Training 0.2370 
Gender (Male) 0.1513 
Top managers and professionals 0.3924 
Other managers and professionals 0.3354 
Foremen and supervisors 0.0438 
Highly skilled and skilled personnel 0.1049 
Unskilled personnel -0.1589 
Unskilled workers -0.2037 
Foreign ownership 0.2336 
Productivity bonus 0.0412 
Medium/large firm 0.0223 
Proportion of full-time workers  0.1765 
Unobservable Characteristics (workers) -0.0039 
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Table 7:  Correlation between firm average wages and observed and unobserved 
attributes, Sample 1 (Stayers) 
 Correlation 

jψ  0.7246 
X β  0.4579 

jtZ γ  0.1530 

'jZ κ  0.6495 
 
 
 
Table 8:  Summary statistics of  iα  and  jφ , Sample 2 (Switchers) 
 

iα  

jφ  
Minimum -1.219 -0.786 
Maximum 2.446 1.512 
Mean 0 0.015 
Median -0.074 -0.008 
Standard deviation  0.452 0.275 
Number of observations 8,052 8,052 
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   Table 9: Correlation between  iα  and worker characteristics, iX , Sample 2 (Switchers) 
 
Coefficient 
Schooling 0.6699 
Tenure 0.1100 
Experience -0.4427 
Training 0.4696 
Top managers and professionals 0.4713 
Other managers and professionals 0.2710 
Foremen and supervisors 0.0215 
Highly skilled and skilled personnel 0.0362 
Unskilled personnel -0.2799 
Unskilled workers -0.2937 
Gender (Male) 0.1789 
Earnings 0.8404 
   
 
 
 
 Table 10: Correlation across unobserved effects, Sample 2 (Switchers) 
 

iα  

jφ   iθ   jψ  

iα  1    

jφ  0.2315 1   

iθ  0.8417 0.4912 1  

jψ  0.3807 0.4948 0.0799 1 
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Table 11:  Correlation between firm average wage and observed and 
unobserved attributes, Sample 2 (Switchers) 
 Correlation 

jψ  0.6878 

jφ  0.5190 
X β  0.8355 

jtZ γ  0.3351 

'jZ κ  0.6548 
38 
Table 12:  Earnings regressions, Sample 1 (Stayers)  
Coefficients 
Variables Without control for unobserved 
worker and firm effects 
(1) 
With control for unobserved 
worker and firm effects 
(2) 
                Worker characteristics:   
Schooling  0.048 0.010 
 
(296.99) (147.57) 
Tenure 0.014 0.011 
 
(306.24) (565.86) 
Experience 0.010 0.004 
 
(181.37) (203.24) 
Gender (Male) 0.151 0.052 
 
(177.08) (151.09) 
  Top managers and professionals 0.864 0.121 
 
(387.54) (134.74) 
  Other managers and professionals 0.600 0.117 
 
(269.45) (130.80) 
  Foremen and supervisors 0.420 0.108 
 
(207.94) (132.43) 
  Highly skilled and skilled personnel 0.220 0.066 
 
(148.49) (110.34) 
  Semiskilled personnel 0.087 0.022 
 
(52.76) (33.34) 
Training 0.086 -0.007 
 
(80.35) (-17.14) 
            Firm Characteristics:   
Productivity bonus 0.206 0.020 
 
(95.79) (23.31) 
 Proportion of full-time workers 0.141 0.029 
 
(34.21) (17.21) 
Proportion of fixed-term contract workers -0.071 0.083 
 
(-24.34) (70.54) 
Foreign ownership 0.076 0.011 
 
(80.63) (27.79) 
Medium/large firm  0.023 -0.018 
 
(22.49) (-38.83) 
Norte -0.065 -0.086 
 
(-66.91) (-220.50) 
Centro -0.104 -0.095 
 
(-69.44) (-156.29) 
Alentejo -0.041 -0.037 
 
(-10.93) (-24.44) 
Algarve -0.004 -0.197 
 
(-0.67) (-90.67) 
Number of observations 714,162 714,162 
F Statístic−  44,044.22 . 
2
R  0.7435 0.9132 
t-statistics in parenthesis. 
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) present the estimates from models (4.2) and (4.3), respectively. The description of variables is 
presented in the Appendix Table A1. The model includes a constant, 27 industry dummies, and 2 dummies flagging the legal 
status of the firm. 
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Table 13: Earnings regressions. Sample 2 (Switchers) 
Coefficients 
Variables Without control for unobserved 
worker and firm effects 
(1) 
With control for unobserved 
worker and firm effects 
(2) 
Worker characteristics:   
Schooling  0.060 0.029 
 
(35.31) (44.54) 
Tenure 0.020 0.021 
 
(16.57) (45.81) 
Experience 0.016 0.025 
 
(29.53) (122.21) 
Gender 0.149 -0.008 
 
(17.15) (-2.37) 
  Top managers and professionals 0.905 0.267 
 
(46.20) (35.67) 
  Other managers and professionals 0.676 0.258 
 
(33.24) (33.20) 
  Foremen and supervisors 0.457 0.269 
 
(21.81) (33.50) 
  Highly skilled and skilled personnel 0.229 0.145 
 
(19.75) (32.59) 
  Semiskilled personnel 0.036 0.095 
 
(2.41) (16.85) 
  Training 0.115 0.013 
 
(10.89) (3.18) 
Firm characteristics:   
Productivity bonus 0.087 0.067 
 
(5.79) (11.75) 
Proportion of full-time workers 0.164 0.015 
 
(5.28) (1.28) 
Proportion of fixed-term contract workers 0.012 0.039 
 
(0.68) (6.00) 
Foreign ownership 0.015 0.062 
 
(1.73) (18.78) 
Medium-large firm  -0.040 -0.022 
 
(-4.02) (-5.74) 
Norte -0.033 0.037 
 
(-3.27) (9.78) 
Centro -0.211 0.032 
 
(-10.25) (4.12) 
Alentejo -0.044 0.009 
 
(-0.92) (0.52) 
Algarve 0.064 -0.035 
 
(1.54) (-2.18) 
Number of observations 8.052 8.052 
F Statístic−  496.31 23,826.05 
2
R  0.7346 0.9925 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
Note: See Table 12. 
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Table 14: Summary statistics of the unobservable heterogeneity of workers and firms, AKM 
methodology 
AKM applied to our data  
(1) 
AKM  (1999, Table IV, p. 293) 
(2) 
  
Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation 

iα  (M – OI) 0 0.469 0 0.405 

iα  (F – OI) 0 0.461 0 0.377 

jψ  (M – OI) -0.064 0.341 -0.036 0.464 

jψ  (F – OI) 0.050 0.645 0.067 0.512 

jψ  (M – OD) 0.260 0.108 0.003 0.069 

jψ  (F – OD) 0.004 0.065 -0.004 0.057 
Notes: M denotes male and F female;  iα  is unobserved ability and  jψ  is the unobserved fixed effect of firms. 
OI and OD are the acronyms for the ‘order-independent’ and the ‘order-dependent’ methods, respectively. 
 
 
  Table 15: Correlation between wages and the unobserved effects 
 AKM applied to our data  
(1) 
AKM  (1999, Table VI,  p. 295) 
(2) 

iθ  0.935 0.931 

iα  0.742 0.733 

jψ  0.246 0.213 
Schooling 0.579 0.414 
 
  Note: Correlations obtained using the ‘order-dependent’ method, Men and Women. 
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  Table 16: Estimates of β  and γ  by Monte Carlo, Sample 1 (Stayers; ˆiθ  fixed) 
Monte Carlo Simulation 
 
Mean 
(1)  
S. deviation 
(2) 
Minimum 
(3) 
Maximum 
(4) 
Table 12, col. (2)  
(5) 
Schooling 0.0099994 0.0000632 0.0098084 0.0102151 0.0097 (0.000066) 
Tenure 0.0109999 0.0000172 0.0109377 0.0110581 0.0106 (0.000019) 
Experience 0.0039994 0.0000204 0.0039188 0.0040642 0.0040 (0.000022)  
Top managers and professionals 0.1210147 0.0008851 0.1178679 0.1240937 0.1210 (0.000898)  
Other managers and professionals 0.1170213 0.0008769 0.1141494 0.1201373 0.1171 (0.000895) 
Foremen and supervisors 0.1079901 0.0007832 0.1052811 0.1099861 0.1078 (0.000814) 
High-skilled and skilled personnel 0.0659933 0.0005535 0.0643694 0.0676667 0.0658 (0.000597) 
Semiskilled personnel 0.0219792 0.0006279 0.0201308 0.0244636 0.0221 (0.000662) 
Gender 0.0520007 0.0003402 0.0509779 0.0530827 0.0520 (0.000344) 
Training -0.0070151 0.0004171 -0.0082837 -0.0056537 -0.0074 (0.000433) 
Productivity bonus 0.0199772 0.0008218 0.0173335 0.0224428 0.0202 (0.000868) 
Proportion of full-time workers 0.0290180 0.0016542 0.0234428 0.0334407 0.0286 (0.001659) 
Proportion of fixed-term contracts  0.0830548 0.0011286 0.0795282 0.0874164 0.0827 (0.001173) 
Foreign ownership 0.0109932 0.0003592 0.0098937 0.0120874 0.0106 (0.000381) 
Medium/large firm  -0.0160171 0.0004006 -0.0174517 -0.0148467 -0.0157 (0.000405) 
Norte -0.0859986 0.0003721 -0.0870803 -0.0845966 -0.0859 (0.000390) 
Centro -0.0950122 0.0005931 -0.0966797 -0.0930806 -0.0946 (0.000605) 
Alentejo -0.0370439 0.0013972 -0.0416618 -0.0321754 -0.0368 (0.001507) 
Algarve -0.1969498 0.0019868 -0.2026307 -0.1907141 -0.1973 (0.002176) 
   Note: The dependent variable in the simulation is given by  
 i j itLn w uθ ψ− − − . 
 
 
Table 17: Estimates of β  and γ  by Monte Carlo, Sample 1 (Stayers; ˆiθ  with normal distribution) 
Monte Carlo Simulation 
 
Mean 
(1)  
S. deviation 
(2) 
Minimum 
(3) 
Maximum 
(4) 
Table 12, col. (2)  
(5) 
Schooling 0.0100002 0.0000685 0.0097766 0.0102089 0.0097 (0.000066) 
Tenure 0.0110003 0.0000182 0.0109350 0.0110626 0.0106 (0.000019) 
Experience 0.0040000 0.0000216 0.0039295 0.0040600 0.0040 (0.000022)  
Top managers and professionals 0.1209664 0.0009362 0.1179862 0.1240024 0.1210 (0.000898)  
Other managers and professionals 0.1169887 0.0008896 0.1140173 0.1198012 0.1171 (0.000895) 
Foremen and supervisors 0.1079642 0.0008392 0.1053727 0.1103254 0.1078 (0.000814) 
High-skilled and skilled personnel 0.0659721 0.0005878 0.0641359 0.0676391 0.0658 (0.000597) 
Semiskilled personnel 0.0219646 0.0006746 0.0200118 0.0239103 0.0221 (0.000662) 
Gender 0.0520009 0.0003530 0.0509562 0.0530952 0.0520 (0.000344) 
Training -0.0070100 0.0004290 -0.0084507 -0.0057893 -0.0074 (0.000433) 
Productivity bonus 0.0200177 0.0008566 0.0178788 0.0276767 0.0202 (0.000868) 
Proportion of full-time workers 0.0290211 0.0016997 0.0230692 0.0337262 0.0286 (0.001659) 
Proportion of fixed-term contracts  0.0830782 0.0011580 0.0796214 0.0868951 0.0827 (0.001173) 
Foreign ownership 0.0109964 0.0003896 0.0098830 0.0120868 0.0106 (0.000381) 
Medium/large firm  -0.0160064 0.0004076 -0.0172912 -0.0146968 -0.0157 (0.000405) 
Norte -0.0859831 0.0003863 -0.0871866 -0.0847645 -0.0859 (0.000390) 
Centro -0.0950116 0.0006026 -0.0968601 -0.0925035 -0.0946 (0.000605) 
Alentejo -0.0370362 0.0015524 -0.0417850 -0.0317029 -0.0368 (0.001507) 
Algarve -0.1969216 0.0021338 -0.2033090 -0.1896298 -0.1973 (0.002176) 
   Note: See Table 16.  
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Table 18: Estimates of β  and γ  by Monte Carlo, Sample 2 (Switchers;  iα  fixed) 
Monte Carlo Simulation 
 
Mean 
(1)  
S. deviation 
(2) 
Minimum 
(3) 
Maximum 
(4) 
Table 13, col. (2) 
(5) 
Schooling 0.0290104 0.0006613 0.0266604 0.0307493 0.0287 (0.000646) 
Tenure 0.0210146 0.0004691 0.0190620 0.0224663 0.0212 (0.000463) 
Experience 0.0249907 0.0002182 0.0241830 0.0257162 0.0245 (0.000201) 
Training 0.0127988 0.0042236 -0.0001219 0.0251638 0.0128 (0.004049) 
Top managers and professionals 0.2668372 0.0086775 0.2431742 0.2923803 0.2674 (0.007498) 
Other managers and professionals 0.2578592 0.0081529 0.2328640 0.2828239 0.2583 (0.007779) 
Foremen and supervisors 0.2691041 0.0082291 0.2448734 0.2947112 0.2688 (0.008024) 
High-skilled and skilled personnel  0.1448386 0.0044957 0.1298593 0.1587391 0.1445 (0.004435) 
Semiskilled personnel 0.0947854 0.0057602 0.0761082 0.1119815 0.0955 (0.005664) 
Productivity bonus 0.0670428 0.0058549 0.0498623 0.0855237 0.0673 (0.005726) 
Proportion of full-time workers 0.0151590 0.0121499 -0.0310917 0.0570088 0.0150 (0.011728) 
Proportion of fixed-term contracts 0.0387175 0.0067440 0.0871570 0.0562703 0.0387 (0.006456) 
Foreign ownership 0.0618605 0.0034178 0.0510272 0.0758158 0.0616 (0.003281) 
Medium/large firm  -0.0220673 0.0039956 -0.0367898 -0.0100911 -0.0220 (0.003837) 
Norte 0.0370223 0.0039155 0.0238178 0.0508251 0.0375 (0.003829) 
Centro 0.0318642 0.0079522 0.0082244 0.0579691 0.0324 (0.007872) 
Alentejo -0.0002988 0.0182522 -0.0644768 0.0539856 0.0094 (0.018257) 
Algarve -0.0370223 0.0159225 -0.0870280 0.0174182 -0.0346 (0.015849) 
   Note: See Table 16.  
 
 
Table 19: Estimates of β  and γ  by Monte Carlo, Sample 2 (Switchers;  iα  with normal distribution) 
Monte Carlo Simulation 
 
Mean 
(1)  
S. deviation 
(2) 
Minimum 
(3) 
Maximum 
(4) 
Table 13, col. (2) 
(5) 
Schooling 0.0290449 0.0007355 0.0264497 0.0323887 0.0287 (0.000646) 
Tenure 0.0210161 0.0004769 0.0195082 0.0223448 0.0212 (0.000463) 
Experience 0.0250050 0.0002050 0.0244297 0.0256973 0.0245 (0.000201) 
Training 0.0129883 0.0042671 -0.0013624 0.0261930 0.0128 (0.004049) 
Top managers and professionals 0.2670442 0.0077661 0.2420791 0.2905999 0.2674 (0.007498) 
Other managers and professionals 0.2578111 0.0078029 0.2326471 0.2824763 0.2583 (0.007779) 
Foremen and supervisors 0.2693494 0.0080113 0.2444046 0.2941111 0.2688 (0.008024) 
High-skilled and skilled personnel  0.1451267 0.0047463 0.1306952 0.1592565 0.1445 (0.004435) 
Semiskilled personnel 0.0953967 0.0057803 0.0716830 0.1142916 0.0955 (0.005664) 
Productivity bonus 0.0668537 0.0059313 0.0458505 0.0858605 0.0673 (0.005726) 
Proportion of full-time workers 0.0151609 0.0123295 -0.0186483 0.0593766 0.0150 (0.011728) 
Proportion of fixed-term contracts 0.0383938 0.0064554 0.0186516 0.0582680 0.0387 (0.006456) 
Foreign ownership 0.0621491 0.0034299 0.0518939 0.0739912 0.0616 (0.003281) 
Medium-large firm  -0.0221641 0.0040793 -0.0349302 -0.0082266 -0.0220 (0.003837) 
Norte 0.0370282 0.0039563 0.0245599 0.0499139 0.0375 (0.003829) 
Centro 0.0325014 0.0078785 0.0093549 0.0599668 0.0324 (0.007872) 
Alentejo 0.0006147 0.0184734 -0.0564151 0.0544352 0.0094 (0.018257) 
Algarve -0.0354781 0.0165162 -0.0877203 0.0189340 -0.0346 (0.015849) 
   Note: See Table 16. 
43 
 
Table 20: Estimates of β  and γ  by bootstrapping, Sample 1 (Stayers) 
Bootstrap 
 
 
 
Bias1 
(1) 
 
S. deviation 
(2) 
95 percent confidence interval2 
(3)                        (4) 
Magnitude 
of bias3  
(5) 
 
Table.12, col. (2) 
 
(6) 
 
  0.0095469 0.0098212  
 
Schooling -1.35E-06 6.99E-05 0.0095464 0.0098258 -1.93% 0.0097 
 
  0.0095528 0.0098304  
 
 
  0.0105849 0.0106612  
 
Tenure -6.63E-07 1.94E-05 0.0105836 0.0106617 -3.42% 0.0106 
 
  0.0105863 0.0106663  
 
 
  0.0044262 0.0045103  
 
Experience 4.42E-07 2.14E-05 0.0044237 0.0045084 2.07% 0.0045 
 
  0.0044230 0.0045067  
 
 
  0.1190461 0.1230121  
 
Top managers and 
professionals 3.32E-05 0.001011 0.1189971 0.1231345 3.29% 0.1210 
   0.1189414 0.1229785  
 
   0.1150532 0.1191361   
Other managers and 
professionals -1.9E-05 0.001040 0.1149566 0.1190609 -1.84% 0.1171 
   0.1150434 0.1190690  
 
   0.1061811 0.1093582  
 
Foremen and 
supervisors 6.08E-07 0.000810 0.1061830 0.1093485 0.08% 0.1078 
   0.1061306 0.1093058  
 
   0.0646410 0.0670369  
 
Highly skilled and 
skilled personnel -1.7E-05 0.000611 0.0645903 0.0670281 -2.82% 0.0658 
 
  0.0646456 0.0671172  
 
 
  0.0208985 0.0232475  
 
Semiskilled personnel 1.36E-06 0.000599 0.0208456 0.0232419 0.23% 0.0221 
 
  0.0208178 0.0231956  
 
 
  0.0513468 0.0527148  
 
Gender 2.36E-05 0.000349 0.0513408 0.0527576 6.77% 0.0520 
 
  0.0512959 0.0527129  
 
 
  -0.0083030 -0.0065360  
 
Training 0.000011 0.00045 -0.0082815 -0.0065568 2.44% -0.0074 
 
  -0.0082815 -0.0065584  
 
 
  0.0184123 0.0220250  
 
Productivity bonus -8.51E-06 0.000921 0.0182485 0.0221213 -0.92% 0.0202 
 
  0.0182103 0.0220236  
 
 
  0.0249988 0.0321158  
 
Proportion of full-
time workers 4.49E-05 0.001813 0.0249815 0.0322694 2.48% 0.0286 
 
  0.024888 0.0321682   
 
  0.0800967 0.0853836  
 
Proportion of fixed-
term contract workers 5.87E-05 0.001347 0.0800572 0.0853901 4.36% 0.0827 
 
  0.0798839 0.0852447  
 
 
  0.0097320 0.0114259  
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Foreign ownership 3.04E-06 0.000432 0.0097461 0.0114317 0.70% 0.0106 
 
  0.0096859 0.0113918  
 
 
  -0.0164254 -0.0149964  
 
Medium/large firm -1.7E-05 0.000364 -0.0164667 -0.0150080 -4.78% -0.0157 
 
  -0.0164406 -0.0149839  
 
 
  -0.0867246 -0.0850793  
 
Norte 5.81E-06 0.000419 -0.0867085 -0.0850329 1.39% -0.0859 
 
  -0.0867085 -0.0850523  
 
 
  -0.095477 -0.0936684  
 
Centro 1.68E-05 0.000461 -0.0954153 -0.0936383 3.65% -0.0946 
 
  -0.0954398 -0.0936556  
 
 
  -0.0389497 -0.0347336  
 
Alentejo 1.39E-05 0.001074 -0.0390008 -0.0348883 1.29% -0.0368 
 
  -0.0390695 -0.0349240  
 
 
  -0.2012195 -0.1933379  
 
Algarve 1.96E-05 0.002008 -0.2012323 -0.1931443 0.98% -0.1973 
 
  -0.2012595 -0.1932159  
 
 
Notes: The reported values were computed considering model (4.3). 
1
 The bias is given by ˆ ˆj jβ β− , where ˆ jβ  denotes the average of bjβ , obtained using the bootstrap samples. 
2The 95 percent bootstrapping confidence interval is obtained using three alternative methods: the first one (row 
1) considers that the distribution of the parameters is a normal distribution, the second (row 2) is obtained by 
finding the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles, and the third (row 3) is identical to the second one but includes a correction 
for the bias. 
3
 The relative magnitude of the bias is obtained dividing the bias in column (1) by the corresponding sample 
standard deviation. 
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Figure 1: Unobserved worker ability (  iθ ) density function 
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Figure 2: Distribution of the coefficient on schooling, Monte Carlo simulation 
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Appendix Table A1: Description of Variables  
Variable  Definition  
Earnings Hourly (log) gross earnings. This variable is obtained 
dividing total monthly earnings (in euros) by the number 
of monthly hours worked.  
Schooling Schooling level in years. 
Tenure Number of years in the current firm. 
Experience Labor market potential experience excluding the 
experience in the current job. It is defined as Age-6-
Schooling-Tenure.  
Gender (Male) Dummy: 1 if the worker is male; 0 otherwise. 
Top managers and professionals  Dummy: 1 if the worker is Quadro Superior; 0 otherwise. 
Other managers and professionals Dummy: 1 if the worker is Quadro Médio; 0 otherwise. 
Foremen and supervisors  Dummy: 1 if the worker is Encarregado, contramestre, 
mestre ou chefe de equipa; 0 otherwise. 
Highly skilled and skilled personnel Dummy: 1 if the worker is Profissional altamente 
qualificado e profissional qualificado; 0 otherwise. 
Semiskilled personnel Dummy: 1 if the worker is Profissional semi-qualificado; 
0 otherwise. 
Unskilled personnel Dummy: 1 if the worker is Profissional não-qualificado; 
0 otherwise. 
Training  
 
Dummy: 1 if the worker has participated in firm provided 
training; 0 otherwise. 
Norte/Centro/Lisboa e Vale do 
Tejo/Alentejo/Algarve 
Dummy: 1 if the firm is located in the 
North/Centro/Lisboa e Vale do Tejo/Alentejo/Algarve; 0 
otherwise. 
Productivity bonus (firm average) Ratio between non-standard compensation and basic 
earnings 
Proportion of full-time workers Percentage of full-time employees in the firm. 
Proportion of fixed-term contract 
workers 
Percentage of fixed-term contract workers in the firm. 
Foreign ownership Dummy: 1 if the firm is owned partial or totally by 
foreigners; 0 otherwise. 
Medium/large firm Dummy: 1 if the number of employees is more than 250; 
0 otherwise. 
Productivity Ratio between gross value added and total hours worked  
 
Note: The training variable at worker level was obtained using an imputation model that draws on the training information at 
firm level. (The imputation procedure is available upon request from the authors.) 
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Appendix Table A2:  Summary Statistics of  iα  and  jφ , Sample 2 (Switchers) 
 

iα  

jφ  
Minimum -1.285 -0.360 
Maximum 2.524 0.670 
Mean 0 0.015 
Median -0.056 0.016 
Standard Deviation  0.464 0.172 
Number of observations 8,052 8,052 
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Appendix Table A3: Earnings regressions. Sample 2 (Switchers) 
Coefficients 
Variables 
Table 13, column (1) 
(1) 
With control for unobserved 
worker and firm effects 
(2) 
                   Worker characteristics:   
Schooling  0.060 0.035 
 
(35.31) (46.55) 
Tenure 0.020 0.024 
 
(16.57) (45.70) 
Experience 0.016 0.029 
 
(29.53) (125.74) 
Gender (Male) 0.149 -0.004 
 
(17.15) (-0.97) 
  Top managers and professionals 0.905 0.268 
 
(46.20) (30.90) 
  Other managers and professionals 0.676 0.226 
 
(33.24) (25.07) 
  Foremen and supervisors 0.457 0.237 
 
(21.81) (25.51) 
  Highly skilled and skilled personnel 0.229 0.114 
 
(19.75) (22.07) 
  Semiskilled personnel 0.036 0.071 
 
(2.41) (10.81) 
  Training 0.115 0.057 
 
(10.89) (12.05) 
                  Firm characteristics:   
Productivity bonus 0.087 0.017 
 
(5.79) (2.51) 
Proportion of full-time workers 0.164 0.035 
 
(5.28) (2.58) 
Proportion of fixed-term contract workers 0.012 -0.004 
 
(0.68) (-0.53) 
Foreign ownership 0.015 0.086 
 
(1.73) (22.05) 
Medium/large firm  -0.040 0.030 
 
(-4.02) (6.64) 
Norte -0.033 0.002 
 
(-3.27) (0.44) 
Centro -0.211 -0.036 
 
(-10.25) (-3.90) 
Alentejo -0.044 0.067 
 
(-0.92) (3.18) 
Algarve 0.064 -0.073 
 
(1.54) (-4.00) 
Number of observations 8.052 8.052 
F Statístic−  496.31 23,826.05 
2
R  0.7346 0.9925 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
Note: See Table 12. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix A1: 
Equation (2.2) in the text follows from the assumption that  
1
.                                                                                              (A1.1)
*
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jt jt jt
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X Zi jt
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W
w e
h N
β γ ς+ +
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which yields, taking logarithms, equation (2.7) in the text, that is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )  ,                                       (A1.4)j i tj i t j i tit it it it j i tLn w Ln w X X β α α ε ω− = − + − + −
 
We note that by replacing (A1.2) by  
'
,                                                                                                   (A1.2')it it itX Zit
it
W
w e
h
β γ ϑ+ + 
≡ = 
 
 
we get  
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )  ' .                                        (A1.4')j i tj i t j i tit it it it j i tLn w Ln w X Xβ β α α ε ω− = − + − + −
 
 In our data, in spite of the evidence in favor of 'β β≠ , the resulting correlation 
between θˆ  obtained from (A1.4) and (A1.4)’ is extremely high, at 0.9719. Similarly for firm 
effects ψˆ . All results reported in section 4 are based on equation (A1.2). 
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Appendix A2: 
 ( ) 2 21T wF Fψσ σ−=  (Proof) 
According to equation (2.17), we have 
 ( )  ( )1' ,                                                                              j jT T jF F F LW X Zψ β γ−= − −
 
which, using (2.15), yields 
 ( ) ( )1 ,                                                                                                 (A2.1)T TF F F F wψ ψ−= +
or 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 .                                                   (A2.2)T T T T T TF F F F F F F F F Fψ ψ ω ψ ω− − −= + = +
 
Then, assuming ˆ( ')E ψ ψ=  , we can obtain the variance of  'ψ , that is, 
 ( ) ( ) ( )  ( ) ( )
 ( )
22 21 1 1 1
2 1
' ( )T T T T T T Tw
T
w
E E F F F w w F F F F F F F F F
F F
ψσ ψ ψ σ
σ
− − − −
−
   
= − = = =      
=
 
It is then easy to prove that ( ) 1TF F − corresponds to a (J x J) diagonal matrix, with the 
(j x j)th element given by 2
1
1
jt
t
N
=
∑
. 
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